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The QDR: Improve the Process to Improve the Product
DAVID E. SNODGRASS

From Parameters, Spring 2000, pp. 57-68.
"To speak or not to speak, to do or leave undone . . . the indispensable virtues--prudence and firmness--one for
choosing a course, the other for pursuing it." -- Gorgias, Greek rhetorician

The quotation above, taken from Secretary of Defense William Cohen's cover letter accompanying the May 1997
Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review, might leave one with the impression that those responsible for that
undertaking were driven by purely noble motives. Rather than accepting such a lofty notion at face value, we must
probe more deeply to reveal the process at work during the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). This is especially
appropriate since more than two years have passed since the completion of the QDR and we can now view the results
with some perspective. In addition, lessons learned from the 1997 QDR and from the accompanying defense review by
the National Defense Panel (NDP) can help guide the next review cycle, scheduled for 2001.
While many in Congress may have held out high hopes that the QDR and NDP would produce meaningful
recommendations for change to meet the nation's future security requirements, the outcome was disappointing. This
article will demonstrate that the results of the QDR and NDP were, perhaps predictably, largely a product of the
bureaucratic structure of the processes used to conduct these two much-publicized defense reviews. Furthermore, this
article will offer recommendations for an alternative structure for the next QDR to increase the freedom and
independence of its operations. Such will improve the chances that the next review will take a truly "fresh look" at
defense and yield a more relevant report.
Background
While there are many pressing needs that compete for the nation's limited resources, defense is ultimately the most
important issue our political leaders must wrestle with. Adequate national security is fundamental to our long-term
prosperity and indeed to our survival. While recognizing this point, Congress and the American people rightly demand
that the defense establishment spend each defense dollar prudently. The unsatisfied demands from pressing domestic
problems, such as growing expenditures for health care and Social Security, place a special burden on decisionmakers
within the Department of Defense to be wise stewards of the taxpayers' money. At the same time, it is important to
note that defense spending, when expressed as a percentage of Gross National Product (GNP), is lower now that at any
time since the Great Depression. Since 1985, when the nation spent seven percent of its GNP (and 28 percent of the
federal budget) on defense, annual expenditures for defense have declined from $400 billion (in constant 1997 dollars)
to $250 billion.[1] Moreover, projections for defense spending are essentially flat through FY 2003, with the DOD
absorbing slightly less than three percent of our Gross Domestic Product in FY 1999.[2] Nevertheless, defense will
continue to consume roughly 15 percent of the federal budget,[3] and even this reduced level of spending remains a
frequent target of defense critics.
The end of the Cold War and absence of a clear and present danger--in the form of a peer competitor--have focused
renewed debate over how much America should spend on defense. To help guide decisionmakers in their deliberations,
Republican Senator Dan Coats of Indiana and Democratic Senator Joe Lieberman of New Jersey set the wheels in
motion in late 1996 for a major defense review.
On 23 September 1996, the Congress passed the Armed Forces Force Structure Review Act of 1996.[4] This
legislation established a requirement for the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to
complete a comprehensive Quadrennial Defense Review by 15 May 1997. In addition, the legislation provided for an
independent National Defense Panel, which was to provide an interim report to Congress by 14 March 1997, an

assessment of the Secretary of Defense's QDR report by 15 May, and a final NDP report to the Secretary of Defense
by 1 December 1997. The Secretary would then have two weeks to formally review the NDP report before forwarding
it, along with his comments, to Congress. Although this rapid turnaround time may seem too short, one must
understand that throughout the QDR and NDP processes there was active communication between the Office of the
Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the NDP. Thus, neither the findings in the Secretary's QDR report in May
nor the recommendations in the NDP's report in December came as a surprise to the other group.
The intent of the legislation was to have the Department of Defense and the National Defense Panel perform separate,
yet complementary, examinations of the nation's future defense requirements, including a recommended security
strategy for the early 21st century. Both groups were tasked to address force structure and modernization requirements,
as well as infrastructure and other elements of the defense budget. While the intent of the legislation may have been
clear to Congress, the Department of Defense and its military departments quickly determined that the QDR was all
about resources and the future role each service would play in national security.
Bureaucratic Politics
One should not be too surprised that the QDR devolved into a turf battle over future roles and missions--and money.
Graham Allison and Morton Halperin offer the compelling argument that government decisions are not reached
through a single rational choice, but rather are the result of the "pulling and hauling" of separate organizations within
the government.[5] This perspective goes a long way toward explaining the behavior of each of the military services,
as well as the actions of the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), which had overall control of the QDR process.
OSD got under way late in 1996, organizing the QDR into seven functional groupings, or "panels," that focused on
particular aspects of national defense. These aspects were strategy, modernization, force assessment, readiness,
infrastructure, human resources, and information operations and intelligence. Logically, one would regard the work of
the Strategy Panel to be the foundation for the work of the other panels. However, OSD insisted that all seven panels
proceed in tandem. While there was some exchange of information between panels, a commonly voiced critique from
those involved with the QDR was that the task of the Strategy Panel should have been completed before the other
panels began work. The probable explanation for this seemingly illogical approach was the desire on the part of OSD
to keep the ensuing debate out of the public domain until the entire report was submitted to Congress. There was
concern within OSD that if the strategy was completed early, it would be subject to external criticism that might cripple
the rest of the effort.
OSD's bureaucratic interest was in producing a completed document that would withstand the inevitable assaults from
various factions within and outside of government. Of at least equal importance to OSD was the goal of providing big
cost savings, a vital concern of the Administration. Therefore, OSD's organizational imperative was to deliver a
strategy and force structure that would keep spending flat at about $250 billion, in constant dollars. The QDR
essentially became a "cut drill" to save big money. To accomplish that, OSD had to keep a tight lid on any nettlesome
QDR leaks to avoid providing ammunition to outside critics, especially those in Congress who might not share the
Administration's desire for defense cuts. Thus, all of the other panels began their work of analyzing and making
recommendations on force structure, modernization, readiness, etc. in the absence of a known and articulated strategy.
What should have been a sequential process, with strategy in the forefront, became instead a parallel process. In
contrast to the QDR, the New Look defense review completed during the Eisenhower Administration offers an
example of how a sequential defense review can be successfully structured.[6] Congress now seems to have
recognized this flaw in the QDR, and has passed legislation directing that the 2001 QDR should be "driven by the
demands of strategy, not by any presupposition about the size of the defense budget."[7]
It is also worth noting that the enabling legislation directed that the QDR look out only through the year 2005, while it
asked the NDP to look to 2010 and beyond.[8] Why did Congress make this distinction? Perhaps the best explanation
is that the QDR was to be centered on the immediate budget process, with a correspondingly shorter time horizon,
while the NDP was to take a long-range, visionary approach. However, the shorter-range perspective of the QDR
created certain problems. For example, since the lead time to develop and procure advanced weapon systems is often
15 years or more, the narrowly focused QDR could not make recommendations for truly fundamental changes, since
these would have extended beyond its time mandate. This was a real handicap.

To counter criticism that the 1993 Bottom Up Review (BUR) had been a closed process, the QDR was billed as more
open. During a QDR briefing prepared by the Joint Staff's J-8 Directorate (Force Structure, Resources & Assessments)
for the CINC (Commander-in-Chief) Conference held in Washington, D.C., on 29-30 January 1997, the CINCs were
told that the QDR process was "inclusive, collaborative, and responsive."[9] The J-8 organization was responsible,
along with OSD's Program Assessment and Evaluation section, for integrating the efforts of the seven panels.
However, the tight timeline for delivering the report, along with the departure of William Perry as Secretary of
Defense and his replacement by William Cohen just as the QDR was beginning, served to make a thoughtful
examination of alternative defense strategies more difficult. Therefore, the desired openness proved to be elusive.
As OSD was organizing its panels, the services likewise sprang into action to support the OSD effort. More important,
each service was clearly motivated to put forth the maximum effort to further its own institutional interests. This led to
sharp and often bitter disagreements among the services over cuts in personnel and future modernization. One of the
more visible expressions of this conflict was the battle between the Navy and Air Force over fighter aircraft
modernization. The QDR's Modernization Panel struggled with the task of trying to support three new fighter
programs--the Navy's F/A-18E/F, the Air Force's F-22, and the Joint Strike Fighter, an aircraft with variants for the
Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps. The challenge was to either find the money to fund all three programs (and thus
satisfy the institutional interests of each service), or make the politically and bureaucratically difficult choice of cutting
one or more of the new fighter aircraft to save taxpayer dollars.
Both the Air Force and the Navy were in need of new jet fighters to replace their existing fighter inventory. The
Navy's mismanagement of its A-12 stealth fighter program during the Bush Administration had caused Secretary of
Defense Cheney to cancel the entire program. Desperate to find a near-term successor for its aging F-14s, the Navy
decided to procure the F/A-18E/F. It feared that without a replacement aircraft early in the next century, it would not
be able to keep its carrier decks full of planes, thus potentially undermining support for the existing fleet of 12 carriers.
The Navy supported the F/A-18E/F because this newer version of the existing F/A-18C/D could be produced and
delivered several years sooner than either the more advanced Joint Strike Fighter or a naval variant of the Air Force's
F-22. Also, since the F-22 was an "Air Force program," the Navy resisted getting involved--a prime example of the
bureaucratic model at work. The Navy made its decision to press ahead with the F/A-18E/F despite the fact that it
represented only a marginal performance improvement over the older version.[10] The General Accounting Office
(GAO) further pointed out that the F/A-18E/F could not be considered a "stealth platform" since it carried external fuel
tanks and external weapons--unlike the stealthy F-117, F-22, and B-2.[11] This point is significant because a decade
earlier the Navy had argued that the need for the A-12 was driven by the requirement for a carrier-based stealth fighter.
Now, the Navy was willing to disregard this previously stated imperative. Indeed, as the GAO highlighted in its report,
the requirement for stealth capability was a stated need for "first day of the war" survivability for the Navy's own
version of the Joint Strike Fighter.[12] This inconsistent reasoning, however, failed to kill the F/A-18E/F. Finally, the
Marine Corps decided to back out of the F/A-18E/F program, preferring to wait for its variant of the Joint Strike
Fighter.[13] Despite all of this, the Navy was successful in its intense lobbying effort to keep the controversial F/A18E/F program alive, although in reduced numbers.
The Air Force's F-22 also came under attack as being too costly and being unnecessary given the likely nature of the
threat. Nevertheless, the Air Force felt confident that the superior performance capabilities promised for the stealthy F22 justified the expense. Then, late in the QDR process, the service chiefs were asked to make sacrifices to help trim
the defense budget. Anticipating similar force structure reductions in all the services, the Air Force Chief of Staff,
General Ronald Fogleman, reluctantly agreed to give up one wing of the planned four wings of F-22s. This was a
decrease from 438 aircraft to 339.[14] The other service chiefs were asked to make similar cuts, but they weren't
biting. The Army fought to maintain its active-duty force structure of 485,000 soldiers. The Navy likewise refused to
budge from its insistence on 12 carriers, while the statutory requirement for retention of three Marine combat divisions
and three air wings meant they were largely immune from cuts.
The voluntary Air Force cut in the F-22 did not spare the service from even further reductions. Indeed, the final QDR
report produced a relatively larger share of cuts for the Air Force than for the other services. Specifically, the Army
was allowed to retain its ten active-duty divisions and take a reduction of just 15,000 personnel from its active force.
The Army did offer up a 45,000-soldier cut in its reserve components (Army National Guard and Army Reserve) to

save dollars.[15] This led to acrimonious charges from the Army National Guard that it had been betrayed by the
active Army. This tension was evident during the August 1997 annual meeting of the National Guard Association of
the United States. When Army Chief of Staff General Dennis Reimer was introduced as a guest speaker, the thousands
of Guardsmen in attendance gave him a tepid reception.[16] The conflicting institutional interests of the active Army
and Army National Guard were exposed and laid bare by the QDR. The Army and Army Guard are now working hard
to heal the wounds.
For its part, the Navy succeeded in retaining its 12 carriers and ten active air wings.[17] The Navy took a reduction of
18,000 active-duty personnel and 4,100 from its reserves--a testament to the Navy's ability to ward off major
challenges to its force structure. The Marine Corps sustained a token active-duty decrease of 1,800 along with a cut of
4,200 from its reserves. The Air Force, in addition to the 25-percent reduction in the F-22 buy, took a cut of 26,900
from its active force. Compared to the other services, the Air Force's active duty losses were larger, both in percentage
and absolute numbers.[18]
This result came as a genuine shock to some in the Air Force, since the service had been largely triumphant during the
deliberations of the Strategy Panel and had succeeded in getting language on "Halt Phase" warfare included in the
QDR report. Indeed, the Air Force considered the language on Halt Phase as a major step forward. The new emphasis
on rapidly halting enemy aggression, the Air Force believed, would increase the appreciation of airpower and lead to a
greater share of the defense budget devoted to the Air Force. Therefore, the Air Force's victory in the early battles over
defense strategy became somewhat hollow, since QDR force structure and modernization decisions were largely
divorced from strategy. This critique of the QDR's parallel approach was an observation shared by the NDP as stated in
its May 1997 assessment of the QDR. The NDP was generally pleased with the QDR strategy, but noted that "program
decisions and priorities would benefit from a much tighter linkage with this strategy."[19]
The record shows that contrary to the expectations of Congress's enabling legislation, the QDR did not produce
sweeping, innovative recommendations. Rather, the bureaucratic process, coupled with the institutional imperatives of
OSD and the services, produced a set of force structure and modernization decisions reflecting the overriding desire of
OSD to produce savings, while each service attempted to retain as much budget share as possible. Although these
deficiencies could be predicted for the QDR, the NDP should have been structured to exhibit more independent and
creative thinking.
The National Defense Panel
Despite the inherent deficiencies in the OSD-led QDR, the "independent" National Defense Panel should have
provided an objective forum for examining our defense requirements. But did it? The legislation specified that the
Secretary of Defense, "in consultation with the chairman and ranking member of the Committee on Armed Services of
the Senate and the chairman and ranking member of the Committee on National Security of the House of
Representatives,"[20] would appoint a chairman of the NDP and eight other members. This was to be done not later
than 1 December 1996. However, the departure of Secretary Perry during this period, and his replacement by Secretary
Cohen, slowed the process. As a result, the NDP members were not in place until the end of February 1997. This made
their interim review of the QDR on 14 March 1997 somewhat superficial.
It is overridingly significant that the composition of the NDP ensured that it would be anything but "independent."
First, Chairman Phil Odeen was the President and Chief Executive Officer of BDM, a large defense contractor. Former
Ambassador Richard Armitage had strong ties to the Navy, as did, quite obviously, retired Admiral David Jeremiah.
Retired General Richard Hearney was a former Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps. Former Ambassador
Robert Kimmitt was a brigadier general in the Army Reserve, while Andrew Krepinevich was a retired Army
lieutenant colonel. Retired Army General Robert RisCassi was a former Commander-in-Chief of US Forces, Korea.
General James McCarthy was retired from the Air Force. Only Janne Nolan, a senior fellow at Brookings, could be
considered a neutral player. Thus the lineup for the NDP had three members of the sea services, three from the Army,
and only one from the Air Force. (And even had the imbalance been in the Air Force's favor, the results would likely
have been no less parochial.) A balanced membership would have been more likely to produce balanced results. The
1997 NDP's recommendations must be viewed with the actual composition of the panel in mind.

The fact that almost every member of the NDP had a prior link to a particular service meant that genuine independent
thought was difficult, if not impossible, to achieve. For example, General McCarthy found himself virtually alone
when advocating airpower solutions to US defense requirements. Perhaps nothing illuminates this point so dramatically
as the striking omission from the NDP report of any mention of Halt Phase warfare, which depends for its execution
upon airpower.
The initial collegial working relationship within the NDP gradually became more strained as time went on. This was
not only due to the composition of the panel itself, but was also a result of the makeup of the NDP's staff. Each service
furnished officers to the NDP to assist the members with their duties. Although the NDP staffers worked in business
suits that eliminated the outward signs of service allegiance, they still retained their service perspectives. Again, this
made objective analysis quite difficult to achieve.
The importance of the staff function should not be underestimated. The staff, which included highly capable officers in
the rank of colonel or Navy captain, prepared briefings for the NDP and drafted the final report. Although the panel
members themselves had the final approval authority, the power of the pen was not trivial. The staff wrote successive
drafts of the final report during the last weeks of the panel's work in October and November 1997. Staffers from each
service labored tirelessly to insert language favorable to their parent service. In the end, the Army was successful in
eliminating the Halt Phase references contained in the QDR report. The long reach of the services had extended into
the very NDP that Congress had charged with being "independent." The net result of the NDP was somewhat
anticlimactic. Congress held hearings in early 1998 to take testimony from the panel members, but nothing substantive
ever came of the NDP's work.
The Hart-Rudman Commission and A Glance Back at the Packard Commission
One might be tempted to despair over the failure of either the QDR or the NDP to fashion meaningful, long-term
changes in America's defense posture. The competing bureaucratic interests that were so much in evidence during the
QDR and NDP processes clearly interfered with objective analysis of the nation's defense needs. However, there is
reason to hope the next review will develop more useful recommendations.
One such encouraging development is the creation of the US Commission on National Security/21st Century, with its
affiliated National Security Study Group (NSSG).[21] The brainchild of former Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich,
the commission was initially headed by former Senators David Boren of Oklahoma and Warren Rudman of New
Hampshire as cochairmen. Senator Boren left in the spring of 1999 and was replaced by former Colorado Senator Gary
Hart. The commission is now also known as the Hart-Rudman Commission. Secretary Cohen also added Gingrich
himself to the commission after the former Speaker of the House resigned from Congress.[22] This organization has
two and a half years--considerably longer than either the QDR or NDP--to craft a new national security strategy, along
with alternatives.[23] The work of the commission is broken into three phases. Phase 1, from July 1998 to August
1999, focused on establishing the likely domestic and international security environments of the first quarter of the
next century. The commission's Phase 1 report was published in September.[24] Phase 2, from August 1999 to April
2000, is exploring how current national security strategies match up against likely future threats to America's security
interests. Phase 3, from April 2000 to February 2001, will develop recommendations to "adapt existing national
security structures or to create new structures" to carry out Phase 2 strategies.[25]
The Hart-Rudman Commission released its interim report on 15 September 1999. It postulates that while "the size of
the world's middle class may increase many times over,"[26] the United States must play an active role in fostering
that kind of future. America's continued economic and military strength will be necessary to help ensure peace in the
new century. New threats will emerge, including the danger posed by income disparities between advanced and
developing nations. The commission believes that threats to the homeland, as well as to American citizens abroad, will
increase. These threats may come from nongovernmental entities such as "terrorists and other disaffected groups,"[27]
which may acquire and even use nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons. Furthermore, America's superior military
capabilities may be ill suited to protecting us from these challenges. The interim report argues that the United States
will need "military capabilities characterized by stealth, speed, range, unprecedented accuracy, lethality, strategic
mobility, superior intelligence, and the overall will and ability to prevail."[28] This is indeed a daunting challenge,
even for a nation as powerful as the United States. The commission will present its strategy for dealing with future

security threats in April 2000.
Unlike the NDP, retired military officers do not dominate this commission. The organization's Commissioners
represent a diverse mix of 12 distinguished Americans, including former Indiana Representative Lee Hamilton, Anne
Armstrong from the Center for Strategic and International Studies, and former Secretary of Defense James
Schlesinger.[29] There are two retired military officers among the Commissioners--General John Galvin, USA Ret.,
and Admiral Harry Train, USN Ret.--while the executive director of the commission is retired Air Force General
Charles Boyd. The commission's study group members are equally impressive, virtually all civilians but reflecting a
broad background in security matters and foreign policy.[30] The significantly longer time horizon allocated for the
commission to perform its work, along with the rich mixture of talent from industry, academia, and the military,
enhances the likelihood that this group will produce a more coherent and far less parochial report.
While one must acknowledge that no one is free of bias, the approach taken in forming the Hart-Rudman Commission
is a positive step. To answer those who might be critical of not having a defense review dominated by retired generals
and admirals, we have only to look at the outstanding results produced by the Packard Commission in 1986.
Led by industrialist David Packard, this earlier commission made recommendations that laid the foundation for the
watershed Goldwater-Nichols Act, which strengthened the authority of the combatant commanders and greatly
invigorated the Joint Staff.[31] The esteemed 15-member panel that served under Packard included only four retired
officers of flag rank: General Robert H. Barrow of the Marines, General Paul F. Gorman of the Army, Navy Admiral
James L. Holloway, and Air Force General Brent Scowcroft.[32] The Packard Commission also included in its
membership future Secretaries of Defense Frank Carlucci and William Perry as well as future CIA Director James
Woolsey.
The Packard Commission made the case for strengthening the office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and
for establishing powerful regional Commanders in Chief, as well as making several specific recommendations for
acquisition reform.[33] From this history, we can be encouraged about the ability of an independent body to seek out
information from competent military sources as it conducts its review, taking positions based solely on the national
interest. The key is to ensure that bright, knowledgeable individuals are brought together without the strong service
connections that characterized the NDP.
Recommendations
While OSD may genuinely want to make substantive changes on its own to force reform of structure and spending
priorities, internal political and bureaucratic dynamics may make such dramatic steps nearly impossible to achieve.
Therefore, OSD should find it easier to embrace creative recommendations coming from a respected study group
outside the department.
With these thoughts in mind, the following recommendations are offered for the 2001 QDR:
Structure a sequential process that builds on the previous strategy work of the 1997 QDR and the results of the
Hart-Rudman Commission, whose final report is due by February 2001.
Adopt the recommendation of the GAO to upgrade the quantitative models used to assess force structure
alternatives, and separately model changes to air, ground, and naval forces.[34]
Extend the length of time allotted to complete the QDR from five months to at least eight to ten months.
Expand the time horizon for the next QDR to 2025 to extend the perspective of the study.
Rather than requiring service consensus, allow each service to make its own force structure and modernization
recommendations, then task OSD and the Joint Staff to evaluate the efficacy of the services' proposals.
For the NDP of 2001, the following suggestions are offered:
Insist on recruiting to the NDP a diverse mixture of high-caliber individuals from academia, industry, the
military, and government. Use the membership criteria for the Packard Commission and the Hart-Rudman
Commission as models for the next NDP.
Limit the number of active-duty or reserve officers from serving as staff assistants on the NDP, for reasons

previously noted.
Ensure that service and OSD perspectives are reviewed by the NDP, but are not inserted into the NDP process
by persons with close ties to a particular branch.
Require the 2001 NDP (unlike the 1997 NDP) to assess alternative force structures to discover which
combinations of force elements (land, sea, and air) provide optimum utility in the types of conflict the United
States is likely to face through 2025.
The recommendations above will not make the next QDR or NDP perfect, but they will go a long way toward the goal
of creating more objective, fact-based review processes. That goal is certainly worth pursuing, for the security needs of
the United States will remain a crucial issue. New threats and opportunities are bound to confront the nation in the new
century. We must take great pains to craft the best possible framework for the review process so that we can produce
the best possible strategies and force structure for America.
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